The peacekeeping operation established by the Security Council in its August 2006 resolution 1704 (2006)—the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)—was preceded by a number of other United Nations operations or missions deployed in this country beginning in 1999 (UN 2006b, par. 1). UNMIT had been established for an initial period of six months, with the intention to renew for further periods (Ibid.).
The former United Nations missions in East Timor are:The Council also decided that UNMIT would consist of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel, and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff officers. The Council requested the Secretary-General to review the arrangements to be established between UNMIT and the international security forces and affirmed that it would consider possible adjustments in the mission structure taking into account the views of the Secretary-General. (Ibid., par. 2)
The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), present during June-October 1999, was mandated to organize and conduct a popular consultation to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted a special autonomy within Indonesia or rejected the proposed special autonomy, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia (Ibid.).
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), present during October 1999—May 2002, was a peacekeeping operation (Ibid.). The Security Council established UNTAET following rejection by the East Timorese of special autonomy (Ibid). UNTAET exercised administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to independence (Ibid.).
The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), a peacekeeping mission present during May 2002—May 2005, was mandated to provide assistance to the newly independent East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities, and to permit the new nation, now called Timor-Leste, to attain self-sufficiency (Ibid.).
Once the peacekeeping mission withdrew, a new political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), present May 2005—August 2006, supported the development of critical state institutions and the police and provided training in observance of democratic governance and human rights (Ibid.).
Initial variables of the data collection process:
UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.
Perception of peacekeeping
No record.
Domestic political environment
Timor-Leste’s leadership is set to face further challenges as it continues to struggle to build a solid institutional foundation befitting a sovereign nation (EIU 2006cp, 5). The country’s development was severely hampered by the rapid deterioration in internal security in April-May, which resulted in the displacement of around 150,000 people—many of whom have yet to return to their homes in the capital, Dili (Ibid.).
Although security has improved, with international peacekeepers maintaining a strong presence on the streets, the country will remain vulnerable to further bouts of serious violence as the government, with the support of the UN, strives to rebuild the defence and police forces, which have been divided along the lines of people from the east (lorosae) and those from the west (loromonu). (Ibid.)
After mounting pressure on him to resign from his post as prime minister and take responsibility for the defence force debacle (when he sacked nearly one-half of the force in March), Alkatiri finally stepped down in June 2006. His successor, José Ramos Horta, an independent member of parliament and a highly respected politician, was sworn into office in July, with the backing of Fretilin and the president, José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão, who enjoys widespread popular support. Dr Horta has managed to bring some stability to government, but his authority could be undermined by Fretilin factions that remain strongly supportive of Alkatiri. Although recently saying that he would resign “in a second” if the people demanded it, Dr Horta is expected to remain in office until the next parliamentary election, which is scheduled to be held in April-May 2007. (Ibid., 7)
The recent violent clashes in Dili and the ongoing sense of uncertainty have seriously disrupted the normal functioning of the economy (Ibid., 6). Given that around 150,000 people were displaced and that one-half of them are still living in camps, mainly on the outskirts of the capital, emergency aid is the main priority, and it will be some time before the economy becomes fully functioning again (Ibid.).
Military affairs
A fledgling defence force has been created: The fledgling East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) has been partially recruited and trained (EIU 2006as, 14). It will eventually consist of 1,500 regular light infantry and 1,500 reservists (Ibid.).
However, the founding of the ETDF and the disbanding of the guerrilla force, Falintil, in early 2000 created resentments. Demobilized former members of Falintil complained that the selection process was biased, both geographically and in the favor of Gusmão.s former Falintil protégés. Fretilin is committed to recruiting a wider range of former members of Falintil, some of whom may well not be acceptable to the present high command. (Ibid.)
Timor-Leste continues to enjoy strong support from regional allies, particularly Australia and New Zealand, in addition to Portugal, which governed Timor-Leste until 1975 (EIU 2006cp, 6). The three countries, together with Malaysia, readily agreed to deploy troops in May 2006 to help to stem the violence in Dili and surrounding areas, and Australia continues to head the international peacekeeping contingent (Ibid.).
Ties with Indonesia will remain close, with the Timorese leadership keen to avoid tension with the former occupying power. The two sides will also continue to make progress in demarcating the land border. The government’s eagerness to maintain close ties with Indonesia partly reflects its wish for Timor-Leste to become a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia is a founding member. However, Timor-Leste is not expected to become a full member of ASEAN for at least another five years. (Ibid., 7)
Climate changes
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.
Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.
